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ABSTRACT
With the looming threat of the next hacking scandal, data
protection efforts in law firms are becoming increasingly crucial
in maintaining client confidentiality. This paper addresses ethical
and legal issues arising with data storage and privacy in law
firms. The American Bar Association’s Model Rules present an
ethical standard for cybersecurity measures, which many states
have adopted and interpreted. Other than state legislation
mandating timely disclosure after a data breach, few legal
standards govern law firm data breaches. As technology advances
rapidly, the law must address preventative and remedial measures
more effectively to protect clients from data breaches caused by
outdated or ineffective cybersecurity procedures in law firms.
These measures should include setting a minimum standard of
care for data security protection and creating a private cause of
action for individuals whose personal information has been
improperly accessed because of a failure to comply with those
standards.

INTRODUCTION
At the intersection of exponentially growing technology and
online data storage, hacking efforts have increasingly targeted personal
information stored by large companies stuck in the past. Recently, a
growing number of companies’ outdated security systems have been
hacked. Hackers are selling customers’ personal information in mass
quantities. Law firms have been targeted because their storage of
confidential information has created an attractive temptation for hackers.1
There is no set of uniform legal standards for remedying the harms caused
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by security breaches,2 as legislation has not caught up with technological
developments and large corporations typically settle cases before trial,
hindering the development of legal precedent. Nonetheless, some existing
client confidentiality and professional ethical standards govern the legal
profession’s interactions with clients.
This brief will address the current cybersecurity regulations, and
lack thereof, on attorneys’ conduct. Traditional lawsuits prompted by data
breaches have mostly appeared against large corporations like Target or
Sony.3 Although law firms are hacked as frequently,4 they are not being
sued, and the details of any consequential data breaches remain hidden
from the public eye. There is little state-level regulation of data security,
and federal regulation of data security is nonexistent.5 Massachusetts is
known for setting a benchmark in data security regulation, but the Office
of the Massachusetts Attorney General opposed Congress’s attempt at
enacting The Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015 which
would have created nationwide data breach notification standards.6 The
Attorney General of Massachusetts, Maura Healey, stated that the reason
for opposition was that a lax national standard, as the law proposed, would
2

Jeff Kosseff, Positive Cybersecurity Law: Creating a Consistent and IncentiveBased System, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 401, 406 (2016).
3
See Ahiza Garcia, Target Settles for $39 Million over Data Breach, CNN
MONEY (Dec. 2, 2015, 5:48 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/02/
news/companies/target-data-breach-settlement/; Edvard Pettersson, Sony to Pay
as Much as $8 Million to Settle Data-Breach Case, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-20/sony-to-pay-as-much-as8-million-to-settle-data-breach-claims.
4
Melissa Meleske, 1 in 4 Law Firms Are Victims of a Data Breach, LAW360
(Sept. 22, 2015, 7:16 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/705657/1-in-4-lawfirms-are-victims-of-a-data-breach (stating that about 150 hacking incidents
involving law firms occurred between May 2014 and May 2015).
5
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undercut the progress that Massachusetts and other states have made
because the law would preempt state laws with a vague national law that
leaves consumers unprotected.7
This new area of law is constantly evolving and legislation will
have to catch up to technology to provide proper remedies for victims of
data breaches caused by lax cybersecurity policies. Recently filed lawsuits
have begun to creatively address these gaps, but there needs to be a legal
standard of responsibility that allows claims relating to both preventative
measures and post-breach accountability to succeed more frequently in
court. State legislatures should require companies to comply with a
minimum standard of care and create a private cause of action for
individuals whose personal information has been compromised as a result
of noncompliance with that standard. Courts should move toward an
interpretation of harm caused by data breach as sufficiently imminent to
pass beyond the threshold of purely speculative harm and confer Article
III standing. This would provide adequate common law remedies to
individuals under theories of negligence.

I. ETHICAL STANDARDS
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) has made an effort to
incorporate cybersecurity into their Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
In 2012, the ABA amended Rule 1.6(c) to state that “[a] lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of,
or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a
client.”8 Comment 18 of 1.6 enumerates factors to consider in determining
whether an attorney has made reasonable efforts, but the list is not
exhaustive.9 The Comment to Rule 1.1 titled “Competence” states that “a
lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including
the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”10 The ABA
was purposeful in its choice of language to allow the rule to evolve,
understanding that any specific reference to technology might quickly
become outdated.11 Many state bar associations have adopted these
7
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and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to
represent clients”).
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Use of Cloud Computing Technology, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 835, 848–49
(2014).
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changes into their respective ethical rules.12 The imprecision of the
“reasonable efforts” language, however, has led to differing
interpretations.
Some of the states that have adopted the 2012 changes or a similar
variation have issued Ethics Opinions as a guide to interpreting 1.6(c).
Massachusetts, for example, interpreted the rule in the context of using
Google Docs for a data storage solution.13 The Committee on Professional
Ethics determined that Google Docs would be an appropriate storage
solution if the attorney “undertakes reasonable efforts to ensure that the
provider’s data privacy policies, practices and procedures are compatible
with Lawyer’s professional obligations.”14 “Reasonable efforts” include
examining the provider’s policies and procedures, making sure the terms
of use prohibit unauthorized access, ensuring that the lawyer has access to
the data past termination of the use of service, examining the provider’s
own cybersecurity efforts, and staying up to date with all of the above. 15
Nevertheless, the Committee’s conclusion is unclear. Ultimately, the
lawyer must use his sound professional judgment to determine whether the
service is compatible with his ethical obligations.
While New York has not adopted the amendments, their Ethics
Opinion 1019 interprets Comment 17 to Rule 1.616 which states that in
sending confidential information, “the lawyer must take reasonable
precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of
unintended recipients.”17 New York listed four steps to consider in
determining reasonable care: (1) “[e]nsuring that the online data storage
provider has an enforceable obligation to preserve confidentiality and
security”, (2) investigating the provider’s own security measures, (3) using
available technology to prevent foreseeable infiltration attempts, and (4)
looking into the provider’s ability to erase data after the business
relationship is terminated.18

See generally CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N
VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: RULE
1.6: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION (2016).
13
Mass. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 12-03 (2012).
14
Id.
15
Id.
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Rule 1.6(c) states that ” [a] lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent the
lawyer’s employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by the
lawyer from disclosing or using confidential information of a client.” MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2012).
17
N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 1019 (2014).
18
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Florida’s ethics opinion on the rule turns to other states’
interpretations in addressing cloud computing.19 In particular, Florida
adopts New York’s list of steps to determine reasonable care.20 It
emphasizes the practicality of Iowa’s Ethics Opinion 11-01.21 The Iowa
opinion sets forth questions that lawyers should ask when considering
using information technology services, including accessibility inquiries on
access, legal issues, financial obligations, and termination of services, and
data protection inquiries on password protection, public access, and data
encryption.22 The Florida opinion adds that the lawyer should consider
whether additional security measures are necessary in cases of particularly
sensitive information.23
This sampling of interpretations shows the variation among what
constitutes “reasonable efforts” in each state. There is no consistent
standard, or even a definitive line to judge attorneys’ behavior with respect
to data security and confidentiality. Even though ethical rules by nature
consist of flexible standards, the risk to client confidentiality, a pillar of
legal ethics, should warrant more predictable standards. It remains to be
seen how helpful the current standards will be as law firms face a growing
threat of hacking.

II. DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS
Forty-seven states have enacted data breach notification statutes.24
These statutes require governmental, educational and private entities to
notify affected individuals of data breaches compromising personally
identifiable information. The statutes vary on which entities must comply,
the definition of personal information, the definition of a breach,
notification requirements, and exemptions.25 Despite the inconsistencies,
these statutes are the closest thing to a universal cybersecurity regulation
protecting consumers. However, the laws do not mandate preventative
measures. They mandate notification of data breaches to consumers,

See Fla. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 12-3 (2013).
See id.
21
See id.
22
See Iowa State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics and Practice Guidelines, Op. 11-01
(2011).
23
Fla. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 12-3 (2013).
24
See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGS.,
(Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informat
ion-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx.
25
Id.
19
20
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which only becomes relevant after a security breach has already
occurred.26 Only some states grant a private cause of action.27
In terms of notification timing, the statutes range in language from
“most expedient time possible without unreasonable delay,” to
“immediately,” to “as soon as reasonably practical,” and to combinations
of the three phrases. Ohio and Wisconsin give a set limit of 45 days to
notify consumers of a breach of personal information.28 The statutes of
California, New York and Texas offer a representative spectrum of data
breach notification statutes. All three cover unauthorized access to
personally identifying information, but Texas and California include
medical data in the definition of personal information.29 Neither New York
nor Texas offer a private cause of action, but while Texas only allows their
Attorney General to enforce compliance, New York allows their Attorney
General to bring an action on behalf of the victims.30 The only penalties
available in Texas are civil fines and injunctive or equitable relief. New
York allows both of those along with recovery of consequential financial
losses to the victim.31 California allows civil remedies, through a private
cause of action, to customers who were injured by a statutory violation.32
Through the enforcement inconsistencies and the fact that the
statutes only cover consequences from delay of notification—not from the
actual breach itself—these statutes fail to adequately incentivize entities
to increase preventative data security measures.
Most of the statutes prescribe civil or criminal penalties for failure
to promptly notify customers. Only 10 states, however, give a private
cause of action to consumers harmed by the failure to comply with
26

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2016); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
521.002 (West 2009); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (McKinney 2013); see
generally State Data Security Breach Notification Laws, MINTZ LEVIN (2016),
https://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2007/PrivSec-DataBreachLaws-02-07/state_
data_breach_matrix.pdf.
27
Id.
28
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98
(West 2008); see generally State Data Security Breach Notification Laws, supra
note 26.
29
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.002; N.Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa; see generally State Data Security Breach Notification
Laws, supra note 26.
30
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.151; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa; see
generally State Data Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 26.
31
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.151; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa; see
generally State Data Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 26.
32
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82; see generally State Data Security Breach
Notification Laws, supra note 26.
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notification requirements after an unauthorized data access.33 Moreover,
courts have been reluctant to find injury caused by late notification in
violation of the statutes.34 While the threat of a penalty might encourage
companies to adopt stricter cybersecurity measures, most of the statutes
do little to address the damage caused to consumers.35

III. STATE STANDARD OF CARE STATUTES
A. Overview
California is one of the minority of states with standard of care
laws for businesses maintaining personal information on state residents.
California Civil Code 1798.81.5(b) states that “[a] business that owns,
licenses, or maintains personal information about a California resident
shall implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices
appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal
information from unauthorized access.”36 This statute also includes a cause
of action for private citizens who have suffered harm from a violation.37
Other states have enacted standard of care statutes, but most are
enforced through penalties for noncompliance and do not give a private
cause of action to individuals. For example, in 2015, Rhode Island enacted
the Identity Theft Protection Act, which requires businesses to implement
a risk-based information security program that contains reasonable
procedures and practices.38 Only the Attorney General of Rhode Island,
however, can bring an action against violating companies if it is in the
public interest.39 Similarly, in 2010, Massachusetts enacted a statute with
the purpose of protecting personal information by mandating the adoption
of a comprehensive information security program by any person who owns
or licenses personal information about a Massachusetts resident.40 Once
again, only the Attorney General of Massachusetts may bring an
enforcement action against a noncomplying person.41 Massachusetts has

33

See generally State Data Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 26.
See, e.g., Corona v. Sony Pictures Ent’t, Inc., No. 14-CV-09600 RGK, 2015
WL 3916744 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2015); Dugas v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts
Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00014-GPC-BLM slip op. (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016);
In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Sec., 996 F.Supp.2d 942, 965
(S.D. Cal 2014).
35
In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Sec., 996 F.Supp.2d at 965.
36
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b).
37
Id.
38
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS. ANN. § 11-49.3-2 (West 2015).
39
Id. § 11-49.3-5.
40
201 MASS. CODE. REGS. 17.01–05.
41
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H § 6 (West 2007).
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some of the most stringent data breach regulations,42 but even so, public
enforcement only results in injunctive relief or civil penalties, with no
relief to the victims of the data breach.43

B. Article III Standing
The first step in obtaining a remedy for a breach of a state standard
of care statute is to prove standing under Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, which requires injury-in-fact.44 Under Article III, “a plaintiff
must show (1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;
and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision.”45 Under the Supreme Court’s
standard in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, a threatened injury
must be “certainly impending” to constitute imminence in injury-in-fact.46
The imminence requirement ensures that the alleged injury is not
speculative or just a claim of possible future injury.47 It is important to note
that the court’s Article III standing analysis is only a preliminary review
of the merits of the case; the parties must subsequently litigate the
substantive issues before any damages can be awarded.
An influential decision from the Northern District of California
abandoned previous courts’ tendency to recognize consumer claims of
compromised but not misused personal information.48 This case, In re
Adobe Systems, Inc. Privacy Litigation, determined that plaintiffs had
standing to bring a class action suit against a corporation for failure to
maintain reasonable data security under § 1798.81.5(b).49 Threatened
harm was enough of a defined threat to be considered imminent and
requiring plaintiffs to wait for hackers to misuse the accessed information

42

Smoyer & Chow, supra note 6.
Lisa M. Ropple, et. al., Massachusetts Adopts Strict Security Regulations
Governing Personal Information, 2009 PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY L.J., 318,
324.
44
U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). For further discussion on injury-infact, see infra Part IV.A.
45
Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180–81.
46
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013).
47
Id.
48
Class Actions and Other Security Breach Litigation, 3 E-COMMERCE AND
INTERNET LAW § 27.07 (2015).
49
In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F.Supp.3d 1197, 1220 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
43
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weakens evidence of connection between the misused data and the
defendant.50
Dugas v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., after
similarly granting standing to the plaintiffs, considered the claim that the
defendant violated their legal duty under § 1798.81.5(b) by failing to
implement proper security protocols.51 The court found that because the
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that Starwood failed to encrypt customer
data in accordance with reasonable industry standards, they had plausibly
alleged a cause of action to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss.52
Overall, though California establishes a standard of care that
companies must comply with, it is difficult to establish adequate injuryin-fact for standing, and even more difficult to properly allege a cause of
action under the statute. It remains to be seen how courts will construe
claims of injuries caused by violations of the statute and until then,
companies (law firms included) will have little incentive to increase their
data security measures.

IV. COMMON LAW REMEDIES
Customers affected by hacks of large corporations have prevailed
in claims based on a theory of negligence, which involves duty, breach of
duty, cause, and evidence of injury. While these cases are often highly
publicized, most companies reach a settlement agreement before the case
arrives in court. Claims against law firms, on the other hand, can be sealed
to prevent exposure of confidential client information.53 Combined with
the novelty of data breach issues, these circumstances contribute to a
sparse record of judicial opinions with which to advance the field.

A. Article III Standing
Negligence and breach of implied contract are the most frequently
used common law claims for affected individuals to recover damages after
a data security breach. Prior to evaluating the merits of these claims, courts
must consider the question of standing under Article III, which requires
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability, as described above.54 There
must have been an invasion of a legally protected interest which is

50

Class Actions and Other Security Breach Litigation, supra note 48, § 27.07.
Dugas v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00014GPC-BLM slip op. at 10 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016).
52
Id. at 10–11.
53
Allison Grande, Edelson Targets Chicago Law Firm over Lax Data Security,
LAW360, (May 5, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/793028/edelsontargets-chicago-law-firm-over-lax-data-security.
54
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
51
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particularized and concrete, as well as actual and imminent.55 There must
be a causal connection between the injury and the claimed wrongdoing.56
And the injury must be likely to be redressed by a verdict in the plaintiff’s
favor.57
The injury-in-fact requirement has become the main obstacle in
litigating data breach cases. Multiple courts have dismissed claims for lack
of standing because the potential risk of identity theft through
unauthorized access of personal information is not considered an injuryin-fact.58 As mentioned above, a threatened injury must be “certainly
impending” to constitute imminence in injury-in-fact.59 In Reilly v.
Ceridan Corp., the Third Circuit dismissed a claim for damages caused by
a security breach for lack of Article III standing.60 The court concluded
that “allegations of hypothetical, future injury are insufficient to establish
standing” and until the alleged injury actually occurs, the information has
not been misused and no injury has occurred.61
The Ninth Circuit has allowed data breach claims, given that the
plaintiff faces a credible threat of harm that is real and immediate.62 In
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had
“alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the
theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data” and granted
Article III standing.63
However, the Krottner decision is limited in application. For
instance, in Antman v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the District Court for the
Northern District of California held that the plaintiff’s allegations of injury
were insufficient because only names and driver’s license numbers were
stolen in Uber’s data breach.64 Even though the court acknowledges that
55

Id.
Id.
57
Id.
58
Arant, supra note 5, at 10; Stephen J. Rancourt, Hacking, Theft, and Corporate
Negligence: Making the Case for Mandatory Encryption of Personal Information,
18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 183, 188–194 (2011).
59
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013).
60
Reilly v. Ceridan Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3rd Cir. 2011).
61
Id. at 42.
62
Id.
63
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010). Even though
the Ninth Circuit granted standing, the court denied that danger of future harm
without present injury, under Washington law (which does not have a standard of
care statute with a corresponding private right of action), would support a
negligence claim.
64
Antman v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:15-cv-01175-LB, 2015 WL 6123054, at
*11 (N.D. Cal 2015).
56
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Krottner was the relevant precedent for injury-in-fact Article III standing,
the court stated that “[w]ithout a hack of information such as social
security numbers, account numbers, or credit card numbers, there is no
obvious, credible risk of identity theft that risks real, immediate injury.”65
Dugas v. Starwood Hotel & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. took an even
more limited view of Krottner. Because the plaintiff only alleged the theft
of names, addresses, billing information, and credit card numbers, the
District Court for the Southern District of California concluded that the
information stolen was insufficient for a third-party to open up or access
any personal accounts.66 Therefore, the personal information stolen was
not in itself sufficient to allege future harm and establish injury-in-fact.67
Theoretically the affected consumers were safe from unauthorized access
to their personal accounts. But in reality, stolen information that
consumers trusted companies to keep private could be used for nefarious
purposes beyond identity theft through access to personal accounts.68
The Fourth Circuit, in Beck v. McDonald, reasoned that mere theft
is insufficient to confer standing: for the plaintiffs to suffer the potential
harm claimed, the court must assume that the thief targeted the data for the
personal information it contained, selected the plaintiff’s specific personal
information, and successfully used it for identity theft.69 This “attenuated
chain of possibilities” was too far removed to be certainly impending.70
The second part of the court’s analysis considered that standing may be
found when there is a substantial risk of future harm.71 Yet even so, the
allegation that 33% of health-related data breaches resulted in identity
theft, assumed to be true, was not enough of a substantial risk to confer
standing because 66% of those affected would suffer no harm.72
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit has recognized a threat of future
harm or a risk of future harm caused by the defendant’s actions as
sufficient to support standing.73 Following the Seventh Circuit’s
65

Id. at *10–11.
Dugas v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00014GPC-BLM slip op. at 5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016).
67
Id.
68
Natasha Bertrand, Here’s What Hackers Do with Your Data, BUS. INSIDER (Oct.
14, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/hackers-are-selling-your-data-inhighly-sophisticated-black-markets-2014-10.
69
Beck v. McDonald, No. 15-1395, No. 15-1715, 2017 WL 477781, at *8 (4th
Cir. Feb. 6, 2017).
70
Id.
71
Id. at *9.
72
Id.
73
Karen A. Popp & Edward R. McNicholas, Standing to Assert Privacy and Data
Security Harms, in 12 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL
66

245

LAW FIRM CYBERSECURITY

[Vol. 15

reasoning, the Southern District of California in Dugas recognized, despite
their limited view of future harm, that another injury that has been
considered injury-in-fact was “lost time and expenses associated with
‘mitigat[ing] the actual . . . consequences of the data theft.’”74 Based on
the Seventh Circuit decision that loss of time by a plaintiff for having to
mitigate misuse of credit card information constituted injury-in-fact75, the
court concluded that the plaintiff had Article III standing.76
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company stated that “[w]here a data breach targets personal
information, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the hackers will use
the victims' data for the fraudulent purposes alleged in Plaintiffs'
complaints.”77 Recognizing that it is unreasonable to require plaintiffs to
wait for actual misuse of their information, the court found that mitigation
costs constituted actual injury.78 While remedies under these theories
would be limited, legitimizing mitigation damages would move precedent
toward recognizing data breaches as causing imminent and quantifiable
damage to consumers and holding organizations accountable for lax
security policies.
A recent case, Khan v. Children’s National Health System,
elaborated on a proper allegation of injury-in-fact: the plaintiff must “put
forth facts that provide either (1) actual examples of the use of the fruits
of the data breach for identity theft, even if involving other victims; or (2)
a clear indication that the data breach was for the purpose of using the
plaintiffs’ personal data to engage in identity fraud.”79 The U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland denied standing to the plaintiff under
not only this theory, but also against the argument that the expense of
guarding against identity theft was an injury-in-fact. Similarly, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nevada in In re Zappos.com, Inc., held
that the purchase of credit monitoring services as a result of breach did not
constitute injury-in-fact because “in order for costs incurred in an effort to

COURTS § 122:28 (Am. Bar Assoc. Section of Litig. ed., 4th ed. 2016). See
generally Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp., 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
74
Dugas, slip op. at 6.
75
The court noted that the Ninth Circuit had yet to address anxiety and lost time
to avoid financial loss as constituting injury. Id.
76
Id.
77
Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Nos. 15-3386/3387, 2016 WL 4728027,
at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2016).
78
Id.
79
Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 2016 WL 2946165, at *5 (D. Md. May
18, 2016).
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mitigate the risk of future harm to constitute an injury-in-fact, the future
harm being mitigated must itself be imminent.”80
Taking a step back, these cases interpret injury-in-fact for Article
III standing, which is only the first obstacle to recovery of damages. They
show that many lawsuits concerning data breaches are not granted Article
III standing. Even if the courts do grant standing, the parties still have to
litigate the substantive issues, and the court has to rule for the victim
plaintiffs before any damages are awarded. However, of the cases granted
standing, most are not litigated but settled amongst the parties. There may
be two reasons for settling: (1) litigation costs are high, and (2) with such
little precedent, the risk of an unfavorable decision for victim plaintiffs is
too high to forego a definite remedy through settlement. Essentially, the
result is a dearth of precedent for data breach case, hindering the natural
development of the law that occurs when courts examine new
technological issues.

B. Common Law Negligence Claims
Even if a plaintiff survives dismissal for lack of standing, injuryin-fact for Article III standing alone does not establish adequately pled
damages for the cause of action.81 The economic loss doctrine can also bar
a common-law negligence claim.82 This doctrine states that recovery of
damages is precluded unless the data breach is accompanied by personal
injury or property damage.83 And without identity theft or other
quantifiable harm, courts have not recognized emotional or dignitary harm
as a personal injury supporting standing under the negligence claim. 84
There is no remedy for data breach victims suffering unquantifiable harm,
despite the tremendous value society presently places on personal
information.
In Dugas, after establishing adequate injury for standing, the court
considered the plaintiff’s negligence claim.85 The court stated that “[i]n
the absence of (1) personal injury, (2) physical damage to property, (3) a
special relationship existing between the parties, or (4) some other
common law exception to the rule, recovery of purely economic loss is
foreclosed.”86 Finding no personal or property injury, and no special
relationship, the court dismissed the claim.87 While companies can avoid
80
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Dugas, slip op. at 10.
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litigation by compensating victims through settlements, victims have
struggled to receive any judicial remedy for their compromised personal
information via negligence claims. In these scenarios, victims are
compensated, but any precedential value the lawsuit may have had for data
breach negligence claims is lost, leaving an underdeveloped body of case
law.
In the legal profession, claims for breach of the duty to act as an
ordinary, reasonably prudent lawyer can be presented as the tort of
malpractice.88 Malpractice claims require the victim to prove the conduct
fell below the required professional standard.89 These claims, however,
usually result in monetary damages, determined by actual injury.90 Courts
likely would not find attorneys liable in unauthorized disclosure cases,
mainly because of a lack of evidence of actual harm.91 Similarly,
malpractice damages must be calculated in accordance with other areas of
law, which requires near certainty of the amount of damages.92 These types
of cases have done little to influence law firms with respect to their
cybersecurity policies.93
In states without as broad a range of technology based litigation
as California, the results have been even bleaker. In Louisiana, for
example, plaintiffs have made claims for negligence, emotional distress,
loss and invasion of privacy, identity theft, harassment, nuisance, fear and
anxiety.94 Yet most of these claims are analyzed as negligence claims,
requiring plaintiffs to show actual harm. 95 Even in cases where personal
information has been compromised, if it has not been used and the plaintiff
cannot prove concrete damages, the claims will be dismissed as
speculative.96

V. CYBER INSURANCE
Even though the risk of costly data breach has created a growing
liability for companies, many courts are holding that commercial general

88

Travis Andrews, Technology & Legal Ethics: The Need for Uniform
Regulation, 70 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 185, 196 (2016).
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Id.
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Id. at 196–97.
91
Id. at 198–99.
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Id. at 200–201.
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Id. at 201. For a discussion of a pending malpractice case, see infra Part VI.
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Michael S. Finkelstein, Overview of Data Breach Litigation in Louisiana: A
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liability (“CGL”) insurance policies do not cover cyber-attacks.97 In
Zurich American Insurance Company v. Sony Corporation of America,
Sony tried to enforce coverage of its commercial general liability
insurance policy after hackers breached its data.98 The Supreme Court of
New York in New York County refused to expand coverage of a CGL
policy to cyber-attacks.99 Similarly, attorney professional liability
insurance policies could have gaps in coverage related to loss of client
data, recovery, business interruption or cyber extortion threats.100
Nevertheless, while corporate purchase of cyber insurance has increased
dramatically in recent years, law firms are slow to follow.101 Cyber liability
insurance is not only helpful in mitigating the impact of data security
failure, but it can include pre-breach services, like breach coaches, cyberreadiness analyses, and security awareness programs.102
As the number of lawsuits rises and breach mitigation costs, both
regulatory and consequential, increase, more firms will likely invest in
cyber liability policies. If so, this could lead to firms taking a more active
role in updating their security policies, in accordance with the requisite
standard of data security outlined by the policy. Noncompliance could
potentially lead to litigation if insurance companies fail to cover firms that
do not maintain updated security procedures. In Columbia Casualty
Company (CCC) v. Cottage Health System, CCC refused to indemnify
Cottage Health System after a security breach, arguing that its cyber
Cyber-Insurance: Latest Developments, INT’L LAW OFFICE, (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Insurance/USA/MendesMount-LLP/Cyber-insurance-latest-developments. However, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals held in an unpublished opinion that a medical records
company’s CGL policy covered the company when it improperly allowed
plaintiffs’ personal information to be displayed publicly. Because the company
published private information electronically, the court held that personal and
injury advertising coverage provision of the policy covered the incident. Travelers
Indem. Co. of Am. v. Portal Healthcare Sols., LLC, 644 Fed. Appx. 245, 247–48
(2016).
98
Jim Vorhis & Joan Cotkin, How Courts Have Decided Coverage Issues in
Cyber Insurance Cases, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2015, at 40.
99
Id.; see also Recall Total Info. Mgmt. Inc. et al v. Federal Ins. Co., 147 Conn.
App. 450, 462–63 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014) (holding that the personal injury
provision of CGL insurance requires not just loss of, but publication of personal
information).
100
Jeffery A. Franklin, Cyber Insurance for Law Firms, 33 GP SOLO, no. 3,
May/June 2016, at 59.
101
David L. Hudson Jr., Net Risk: Cyber Liability Insurance is an Increasingly
Popular, Almost Necessary Choice for Law Firms, ABA J. (Apr. 2015),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/cyber_liability_insurance_is_incre
asingly_popular_almost_necessary_choice/.
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insurance policy covering Cottage Health System required the company to
adhere to basic security practices, which they failed to do.103 These types
of preventative security measures, although motivated by the desire to pass
liability on to insurance companies, can help to reduce the amount and
magnitude of future breaches.
Unfortunately, recent court interpretations of cyber insurance
coverage have narrowly construed the scope of the policies. In one of the
first cyber insurance coverage rulings, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Utah held that a cyber liability policy covering losses caused by
an “errors and omissions wrongful act” does not cover non-negligent
acts.104 The court’s narrow view that only allegations on a theory of
negligence are within the scope of the policy contrasts with many prior
interpretations of CGL coverage.105 Courts have held that CGL insurance
typically affords coverage for non-negligence claims, based on the theory
that error or omission incorporates more than negligent conduct.106
P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Company
further showed the holes that cyber insurance policies can have built into
them.107 Here, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona held that
P.F. Chang’s cyber insurance policy’s Privacy Injury provision required
that the compromised information be owned by the claimant.108 P.F.
Chang’s was assessed over $1.9 million in fees from their credit card
services intermediary as a result of a data breach.109 But because the
intermediary did not own the personal information—P.F. Chang’s did—
the insurance policy did not cover P.F. Chang’s claim for reimbursement
of the intermediary’s assessments.110 The court also found that other
claims, which would have been covered, fell under the policy’s contractual
liability exclusion, which lacked customary carve-outs.111
These two cases show a very narrow interpretation of the cyber
insurance coverage provisions, compared to cases construing CGL
103
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policies, and highlight two problems. First, cyber insurance policyholders
must anticipate potential holes in in their policies because a lack of
industry standard has led to custom carve-outs and unexpected exclusions
to coverage. Second, without much history of court guidance in
interpretation, policyholders may be unsure of the scope of their coverage
and may find out too late, and after much litigation, that a data breach is
not covered by their policy.

VI. THE LEGAL FUTURE OF PREVENTATIVE AND REMEDIAL
MEASURES AMIDST A GROWING THREAT OF DATA BREACH
Overall, a significant regulatory gap exists in the area of law firm
data storage protection. With statutory and common law remedies rarely
recovering damages for victims of cybersecurity breaches, litigation
strategies have had to get more creative. In a current case, Shore v. Johnson
and Bell, a recently unsealed complaint112 revealed claims against a law
firm for breach of contract, malpractice, unjust enrichment and breach of
fiduciary duty for not adequately protecting client data from exposure.113
The complaint seeks injunctive relief and damages through a theory that
clients have been overpaying for legal services which should have
included data protection.114 The firm representing the plaintiff appears to
be seeking improvement in law firm data security efforts and hopefully
will pursue litigation over settlement. Through their novel theory that
clients have been overpaying for legal services, monetary damages may
be more easily quantifiable and as a result, the court may be more receptive
to recognizing actual injury.
In New York, a couple is suing their attorney for using an AOL
account and failing to use protective measures, leading to malware
infecting her computer.115 The clients, engaging in a real estate purchase,
were contacted by cybercriminals pretending to be the property seller’s
attorney and asked to make a deposit of $1.9 million on the property.116
The complaint was originally temporarily sealed because it “reveal[ed], in
explicit detail, where and how [Defendant] had left its clients' confidential
information unsecured and unprotected.” On December 8, 2016, the Northern
District of Illinois granted plaintiff’s motion to unseal the case, revealing the
plaintiff’s legal theories and bringing the defendant’s vulnerabilities to light.
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 1, Shore v. Johnson and Bell, 2016 WL
7197421 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (No. 16-cv-4363).
113
Complaint at 21–28, Shore v. Johnson and Bell, 2016 WL 7197421 (N.D. Ill.
2016) (No. 16-cv-4363).
114
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Here, though, because the plaintiffs made the deposit and only recovered
a portion of the funds, they can make a showing of actual damages.
As the number of hacking incidents increases, we will see more
and more clients of high profile firms without a remedy for the firm’s
inability to maintain adequate data security. For example, just last year,
both Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP and Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP
suffered data breaches.117 When consumer information is stolen from
credit card companies or retail chains, victims can often show economic
injury for identity theft or unreimbursed fraudulent purchases. But more
often law firm data is targeted for information on mergers, patent and trade
secrets or litigation strategy and does not cause traditional economic
harm.118 If our judicial system is to hold law firms accountable for out-ofdate cybersecurity practices, we must create a right of action for private
citizens negatively affected, though not necessarily traditionally
economically injured, by data breaches.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, law firm data security is governed by state ethical
obligations, state data breach notification laws, and minimally enforced by
malpractice suits. There is no federal standard of regulation, so each
individual state has had to create and interpret these rules. Because this is
a new area of law for many courts and large corporations tend to settle
cases before the litigation stage, legal precedent is not much help in
evolving the doctrine to encompass new rights that follow technological
trends. While a vague national standard that preempts state laws would be
a step backward for consumer protection, a national standard would allow
corporations and other entities to more easily comply with data security
standards by eliminating individual nuances of state regulation in states
where they conduct business. Massachusetts, for example, while in
opposition to a national law that preempts its more rigorous state
standards, is in favor of a law that would continue to require breach
notification to state authorities who would ultimately be responsible for
enforcement.119
Our legal system needs to focus more on preventative measures
instead of only providing remedies after a breach has occurred, and often
only when there has been a violation of a data breach notification statute
or demonstrable damages. If we wait for each individual firm to get hacked
before determining that its protection measures were inadequate, then
more and more confidential client information will be exposed before the
firm has any incentive to update their policies, especially if the only
117

Randall & Kroll, supra note 1, at 54.
Id.
119
Smoyer & Chow, supra note 6.
118

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

252

incentive is negative publicity rather than reparations to the injured parties
or monetary penalties. Courts need to step up, like the court of the
Northern District of California in Adobe Systems,120 to interpret
unauthorized access to data as creating a risk of imminent harm, rather
than purely speculative harm. The legislature needs to step up and enact
standard of care laws for data protection, giving individuals a private right
of action to seek damages for businesses’ failure to comply. The law has
always been slow to catch up to technological advances, but leaving this
regulatory gap unaddressed could come at a steep price.

120

Even though the case ultimately settled without litigation of the substantive
issues, precedents legitimizing data breaches as injury-in-fact for Article III
standing could create a higher risk of litigation for organizations and incentivize
more rigorous precautionary security measures.

